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Abstract. In its more than ten years of existence, the Tor network has
seen hundreds of thousands of relays come and go. Each relay maintains
several RSA keys, amounting to millions of keys, all archived by The
Tor Project. In this paper, we analyze 3.7 million RSA public keys of
Tor relays. We (i) check if any relays share prime factors or moduli,
(ii) identify relays that use non-standard exponents, (iii) characterize
malicious relays that we discovered in the first two steps, and (iv) de-
velop a tool that can determine what onion services fell prey to said
malicious relays. Our experiments revealed that ten relays shared mod-
uli and 3,557 relays—almost all part of a research project—shared prime
factors, allowing adversaries to reconstruct private keys. We further dis-
covered 122 relays that used non-standard RSA exponents, presumably
in an attempt to attack onion services. By simulating how onion services
are positioned in Tor’s distributed hash table, we identified four onion
services that were targeted by these malicious relays. Our work provides
both The Tor Project and onion service operators with tools to identify
misconfigured and malicious Tor relays to stop attacks before they pose
a threat to Tor users.
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1 Introduction
Having seen hundreds of thousands of relays come and go over the last decade,
the Tor network is the largest volunteer-run anonymity network. To implement
onion routing, all the relays maintain several RSA key pairs, the most impor-
tant of which are a medium-term key that rotates occasionally and a long-term
key that ideally never changes. Most relays run The Tor Project’s reference
C implementation on dedicated Linux systems, but some run third-party im-
plementations or operate on constrained systems such as Raspberry Pis which
raises the question of whether these machines managed to generate safe keys
upon bootstrapping. Past work has investigated the safety of keys in TLS and
SSH servers [15], in nation-wide databases [3], as well as in POP3S, IMAPS, and
⋆ All four authors contributed substantially and share first authorship. The names are
ordered alphabetically.
2SMTPS servers [14]. In this work, we study the Tor network and pay particular
attention to Tor-specific aspects such as onion services.
Relays with weak cryptographic keys can pose a significant threat to Tor
users. The exact impact depends on the type of key that is vulnerable. In the
best case, an attacker only manages to compromise the TLS layer that protects
Tor cells, which are also encrypted. In the worst case, an attacker compromises a
relay’s long-term “identity key,” allowing her to impersonate the relay. To protect
Tor users, we need methods to find relays with vulnerable keys and remove them
from the network before adversaries can exploit them.
Drawing on a publicly-archived dataset of 3.7 million RSA public keys [30], we
set out to analyze these keys for weaknesses and anomalies: we looked for shared
prime factors, shared moduli, and non-standard RSA exponents. To our surprise,
we found more than 3,000 keys with shared prime factors, most belonging to a
2013 research project [4]. Ten relays in our dataset shared a modulus, suggesting
manual interference with the key generation process. Finally, we discovered 122
relays whose RSA exponent differed from Tor’s hard-coded exponent. Most of
these relays were meant to manipulate Tor’s distributed hash table (DHT) in an
attempt to attack onion services as we discuss in Section 5.4. To learn more, we
implemented a tool—itos3—that simulates how onion services are placed on the
DHT, revealing four onion services that were targeted by some of these malicious
relays. Onion service operators can use our tool to monitor their services’ secu-
rity; e.g., a newspaper can make sure that its SecureDrop deployment—which
uses onion services—is safe [11].
The entities responsible for the incidents we uncovered are as diverse as the
incidents themselves: researchers, developers, and actual adversaries were all
involved in generating key anomalies. By looking for information that relays had
in common, such as similar nicknames, IP address blocks, uptimes, and port
numbers, we were able to group the relays we discovered into clusters that were
likely operated by the same entities, shedding light on the anatomy of real-world
attacks against Tor.
We publish all our source code and data, allowing third parties such as The
Tor Project to continuously check the keys of new relays and alert developers
if any of these keys are vulnerable or non-standard.4 Tor developers can then
take early action and remove these relays from the network before adversaries
get the chance to take advantage of them. In summary, we make the following
three contributions:
– We analyze a dataset consisting of 3.7 million RSA public keys for weak and
non-standard keys, revealing thousands of affected keys.
– We characterize the relays we discovered, show that many were likely op-
erated by a single entity, and uncover four onion services that were likely
targeted.
3 The name is an acronym for “identifying targeted onion services.”
4 Our project page is available online at https://nymity.ch/anomalous-tor-keys/.
3– Given a set of malicious Tor relays that served as “hidden service directories,”
we develop and implement a method that can reveal what onion services
these relays were targeting.
The rest of this paper details our project. In Section 2, we provide background
information, followed by Section 3 where we discuss related work. In Section 4,
we describe our method, and Section 5 presents our results. We discuss our work
in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 Background
We now provide brief background on the RSA cryptosystem, how the Tor net-
work employs RSA, and how onion services are implemented in the Tor network.
2.1 The RSA cryptosystem
The RSA public key cryptosystem uses key pairs consisting of a public encryption
key and a privately held decryption key [27]. The encryption key, or “RSA public
key,” is comprised of a pair of positive integers: an exponent e and a modulus
N . The modulus N is the product of two large, random prime numbers p and
q. The corresponding decryption key, or “RSA private key,” is comprised of the
positive integer pair d and N , where N = pq and d = e−1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1).
The decryption exponent d is efficient to compute if e and the factorization of
N are known.
The security of RSA rests upon the difficulty of factorizing N into its prime
factors p and q. While factorizing N is impractical given sufficiently large prime
factors, the greatest common divisor (GCD) of two moduli can be computed in
mere microseconds. Consider two distinct RSA moduli N1 = pq1 and N2 = pq2
that share the prime factor p. An attacker could quickly and easily compute
the GCD of N1 and N2, which will be p, and then divide the moduli by p
to determine q1 and q2, thus compromising the private key of both key pairs.
Therefore, it is crucial that both p and q are determined using a strong random
number generator with a unique seed.
Even though the naive GCD algorithm is very efficient, our dataset consists
of more than 3.7 million keys and naively computing the GCD of every pair
would take more than three years of computation (assuming 15 µs per pair).
Instead, we use the fast pairwise GCD algorithm by Bernstein [2] which can
perform the computation at hand in just a few minutes.
2.2 The Tor network
The Tor network is among the most popular tools for digital privacy and anonymity.
As of December 2017, the Tor network consists of around 7,000 volunteer-run
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Fig. 1. The protocol stack between two Tor relays Rn and Rn+1. The lowest encryption
layer is a TLS connection that contains one (between the middle and exit relay) to
three (between the client and guard relay) onion layers. The onion layers protect the
application data that the client is sending.
relays [31]. Each hour, information about all relays5 is summarized in the net-
work consensus, which is used by clients to bootstrap a connection to the Tor
network. The network consensus is produced by eight geographically-distributed
directory authorities, machines run by individuals trusted by The Tor Project.
For each relay in the consensus, there is a pointer to its descriptor, which contains
additional, relay-specific information such as cryptographic keys.
Each of the ∼7,000 relays maintains RSA, Curve25519, and Ed25519 key
pairs to authenticate and protect client traffic [9, § 1.1]. In this work, we analyze
the RSA keys. We leave the analysis of the other key types for future work. Each
Tor relay has the following three 1024-bit RSA keys:
Identity key Relays have a long-term identity key that they use only to sign
documents and certificates. Relays are frequently referred to by their finger-
prints, which is a hash over their identity key. The compromise of an identity
key would allow an attacker to impersonate a relay by publishing spoofed
descriptors signed by the compromised identity key.
Onion key Relays use medium-term onion keys to decrypt cells when circuits
are created. The onion key is only used in the Tor Authentication Protocol
that is now superseded by the ntor handshake [13]. A compromised onion
key allows the attacker to read the content of cells until the key pair rotates,
which happens after 28 days [32, § 3.4.1]. However, the onion key layer is
protected by a TLS layer (see Figure 1) that an attacker may have to find a
way around.
Connection key The short-term connection keys protect the connection be-
tween relays using TLS and are rotated at least once a day [9, § 1.1]. The
TLS connection provides defense in depth as shown in Figure 1. If com-
promised, an attacker is able to see the encrypted cells that are exchanged
between Tor relays.
In our work we consider the identity keys and onion keys that each relay has
because the Tor Project has been archiving the public part of the identity and
onion keys for more than ten years, allowing us to draw on a rich dataset [30]. The
5 This information includes IP addresses, ports, version numbers, and cryptographic
information, just to name a few.
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Fig. 2. Each day, an onion service places its descriptor ID at a pseudorandom location
in Tor’s “hash ring,” which consists of all HSDir relays (illustrated as circles).
Tor Project does not archive the connection keys because they have short-term
use and are not found in the network consensus or relay descriptors.
2.3 Onion services
In addition to client anonymity, the Tor network allows operators to set up
anonymous servers, typically called “onion services.”6 The so-called “hidden ser-
vice directories,” or “HSDirs,” are a subset of all Tor relays and comprise a
distributed hash table (DHT) that stores the information necessary for a client
to connect to an onion service. These HSDirs are a particularly attractive target
to adversaries because they get to learn about onion services that are set up
in the Tor network. An onion service’s position in the DHT is governed by the
following equations:
secret-id-part = SHA-1(time-period |
descriptor-cookie |
replica)
descriptor-id = SHA-1(permanent-id |
secret-id-part)
(1)
Secret-id-part depends on three variables: time-period represents the number
of days since the Unix epoch; descriptor-cookie is typically unused and hence
empty; and replica is set to both the values 0 and 1, resulting in two hashes
for secret-id-part. The concatenation of both permanent-id (the onion service’s
hashed public key) and secret-id-part is hashed, resulting in descriptor-id, which
determines the position in the DHT. When arranging all HSDirs by their finger-
print in ascending order, the three immediate HSDir neighbors in the positive
6 The term “hidden services” was used in the past but was discontinued, in part because
onion services provide more than just “hiding” a web site.
6direction constitute the first replica while the second replica is at another, pseu-
dorandom location, as shown in Figure 2. The onion service’s descriptor ID and
hence, its two replicas, changes every day when time-period increments.
3 Related work
In 2012, Lenstra et al. [20] and Heninger et al. [15] independently analyzed a large
set of RSA public keys used for TLS, SSH, and PGP. Both groups discovered
that many keys shared prime factors, allowing an attacker to efficiently compute
the corresponding private keys. The researchers showed that the root cause was
weak randomness at the time of key generation: Many Internet-connected devices
lack entropy sources, resulting in predictable keys.
One year later, Bernstein et al. [3] showed similar flaws in Taiwan’s national
“Citizen Digital Certificate” database. Among more than two million 1024-bit
RSA keys, the authors discovered 184 vulnerable keys, 103 of which shared
prime factors. The authors could break the remaining 81 keys by applying a
Coppersmith-type partial-key-recovery attack [6,7].
Valenta et al. [36] optimized popular implementations for integer factoriza-
tion, allowing them to factor 512-bit RSA public keys on Amazon EC2 in under
four hours for only $75. The authors then moved on to survey the RSA key
sizes that are used in popular protocols such as HTTPS, DNSSEC, and SSH,
discovering numerous keys of only 512 bits.
Most recently, in 2016, Hastings et al. [14] revisited the problem of weak
keys and investigated how many such keys were still on the Internet four years
after the initial studies. The authors found that many vendors and device owners
never patched their vulnerable devices. Surprisingly, the number of vulnerable
devices has actually increased since 2012.
4 Method
In this section, we discuss how we drew on a publicly-available dataset (Sec-
tion 4.1) and used Heninger and Halderman’s fastgcd [16] tool to analyze the
public keys that we extracted from this dataset (Section 4.2).
4.1 Data collection
The Tor Project archives data about Tor relays on its CollecTor platform [30],
allowing researchers to learn what relays were online at any point in the past.
Drawing on this data source, we compiled a set of RSA keys by downloading
all server descriptors from December 2005 to December 2016 and extracting the
identity and onion keys with the Stem Python library [19]. Table 1 provides an
overview of the resulting dataset—approximately 200 GB of unzipped data. Our
3.7 million public keys span eleven years and were created on one million IP
addresses.
7Table 1. An overview of our RSA public key dataset.
First key published 2005-12
Last key published 2016-12
Number of relays (by IP address) 1,083,805
Number of onion keys 3,174,859
Number of identity keys 588,945
Total number of public keys 3,763,804
Our dataset also contains the keys of Tor’s directory authorities. The au-
thorities’ keys are particularly sensitive: If an attacker were to compromise more
than half of these keys, she could create a malicious network consensus—which
could consist of attacker-controlled relays only—that would then be used by Tor
clients. Therefore these keys are paramount to the security of the Tor network.
4.2 Finding vulnerable keys
To detect weak, potentially factorable keys in the Tor network, we used Heninger
and Halderman’s fastgcd [16] tool which takes as input a set of moduli from
public keys and then computes the pair-wise greatest common divisor of these
moduli. Fastgcd’s C implementation is based on a quasilinear-time algorithm for
factoring a set of integers into their co-primes. We used the PyCrypto library [21]
to turn Tor’s PKCS#1-padded, PEM-encoded keys into fastgcd’s expected for-
mat, which is hex-encoded moduli. Running fastgcd over our dataset took less
than 20 minutes on a machine with dual, eight-core 2.8 GHz Intel Xeon E5 2680
v2 processors with 256 GB of RAM.
Fastgcd benefits from having access to a pool of moduli that is as large
as possible because it allows the algorithm to draw on a larger factor base to
use on each key [15]. To that end, we reached out to Heninger’s group at the
University of Pennsylvania, and they graciously augmented their 129 million key
dataset with our 3.6 million keys and subsequently searched for shared factors.
The number of weak keys did not go up, but this experiment gave us more
confidence that we had not missed weak keys.
5 Results
We present our results in four parts, starting with shared prime factors (Sec-
tion 5.1), followed by shared moduli (Section 5.2), unusual exponents (Sec-
tion 5.3), and finally, targeted onion services (Section 5.4).
5.1 Shared prime factors
Among all 588,945 identity keys, fastgcd found that 3,557 (0.6%) moduli share
prime factors. We believe that 3,555 of these keys were all controlled by a single
8research group, and upon contacting the authors of the Security & Privacy 2013
paper entitled “Trawling for Tor hidden services” [4], we received confirmation
that these relays were indeed run by their research group. The authors informed
us that the weak keys were caused by a shortcoming in their key generation
tool. The issue stemmed from the fact that their tool first generated thousands
of prime numbers and then computed multiple moduli using combinations of
those prime numbers in a greedy fashion without ensuring that the same primes
were not reused. Because of the following shared properties, we are confident
that all relays were operated by the researchers:
1. All relays were online either between November 11, 2012 and November
16, 2012 or between January 14, 2013 and February 6, 2013, suggesting
two separate experiments. We verified this by checking how long the relays
stayed in the Tor network consensus. The Tor consensus is updated hourly
and documents which relays are available at a particular time. This data is
archived by The Tor Project and is made publicly available on the CollecTor
platform [30].
2. All relays exhibited a predictable port assignment scheme. In particular, we
observed ports {7003, 7007, . . . , 7043, 7047} and {8003, 8007, . . . , 8043,
8047}.
3. Except for two machines that were located in Russia and Luxembourg, all
machines were hosted in Amazon’s EC2 address space. All machines except
the one located in Luxembourg used Tor version 0.2.2.37.
4. All physical machines had multiple fingerprints. 1,321 of these 3,557 relays
were previously characterized by Winter et al. [38, § 5.1].
The remaining two keys belonged to a relay named “DesasterBlaster,” whose
origins we could not determine. Its router descriptor indicates that the relay has
been hosted on a MIPS machine which might suggest an embedded device with
a weak random number generator:
router DesasterBlaster 62.226.55.122 9001 0 0
platform Tor 0.2.2.13-alpha on Linux mips
To further investigate, we checked whether the relay “DesasterBlaster” shares
prime factors with any other relays. It appears that the relay has rotated multiple
identity keys, and it only shares prime factors with its own keys. Unfortunately
the relay did not have any contact information configured which is why we could
not get in touch with its operator.
5.2 Shared moduli
In addition to finding shared prime factors, we discovered relays that share a
modulus, giving them the ability to calculate each other’s private keys. With p, q,
and each other’s es in hand, the two parties can compute each other’s decryption
exponent d, at which point both parties now know the private decryption keys.
9Table 2. Four groups of relays that have a shared modulus. All relays further share a
fingerprint prefix in groups of two or three, presumably to manipulate Tor’s distributed
hash table.
Short fingerprint IP address Exponent
838A296A 188.165.164.163 1,854,629
838A305F 188.165.26.13 718,645
838A71E2 178.32.143.175 220,955
2249EB42 188.165.26.13 4,510,659
2249EC78 178.32.143.175 1,074,365
E1EFA388 188.165.3.63 18,177
E1EF8985 188.165.138.181 546,019
E1EF9EB8 5.39.122.66 73,389
410BA17E 188.165.138.181 1,979,465
410BB962 5.39.122.66 341,785
Table 2 shows these ten relays with shared moduli clustered into four groups.
The table shows the relays’ truncated, four-byte fingerprint, IP addresses, and
RSA exponents. Note that the Tor client hard-codes the RSA exponent to
65,537 [9, § 0.3], a recommended value that is resistant to attacks against low
public exponents [5, § 4]. Any value other than 65,537 indicates non-standard
key generation. All IP addresses were hosted by OVH, a popular French hosting
provider, and some of the IP addresses hosted two relays, as our color coding in-
dicates. Finally, each group shared a four- or five-digit prefix in their fingerprints.
We believe that a single attacker controlled all these relays with the intention to
manipulate the distributed hash table that powers onion services [4]—the shared
fingerprint prefix is an indication. Because the modulus is identical, we suspect
that the attackers iterated over the relays’ RSA exponents to come up with the
shared prefix. The Tor Project informed us that it discovered and blocked these
relays in August 2014 when they first came online.
5.3 Unusual exponents
Having accidentally found a number of relays with non-standard exponents in
Section 5.2, we checked if our dataset featured more relays with exponents other
than 65,537. Non-standard exponents may indicate that a relay was after a
specific fingerprint in order to position itself in Tor’s hash ring. To obtain a
fingerprint with a given prefix, an adversary repeatedly has to modify any of
the underlying key material p, q, or e until they result in the desired prefix.
Repeated modification of e is significantly more efficient than modifying p or q
because it is costly to verify if a large number is prime. Leveraging this method,
the tool Scallion [29] generates vanity onion service domains by iterating over
the service’s public exponent.
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Among all of our 3.7 million keys, 122 possessed an exponent other than
65,537. One relay had both non-standard identity and onion key exponents while
all remaining relays only had non-standard identity key exponents. Ten of these
relays further had a shared modulus, which we discuss in Section 5.2. Assuming
that these relays positioned themselves in the hash ring to attack an onion
service, we wanted to find out what onion services they targeted. One can identify
the victims by first compiling a comprehensive list of onion services and then
determining each service’s position in the hash ring at the time the malicious
HSDirs were online.
5.4 Identifying targeted onion services
We obtained a list of onion services by augmenting the list of the Ahmia search
engine [25] with services that we discovered via Google searches and by con-
tacting researchers who have done similar work [23]. We ended up with a list
of 17,198 onion services that were online at some point in time. Next, we de-
veloped a tool that takes as input our list of onion services and the malicious
HSDirs we discovered.7 The tool then calculates all descriptors these onion ser-
vices ever generated and checks if any HSDir shared five or more hex digits in
its fingerprint prefix with the onion service’s descriptor. We chose the threshold
of five manually because it is unlikely to happen by chance yet easy to create a
five-digit collision.
It is difficult to identify all targeted onion services because (i) our list of
onion services does not tell us when a service was online, (ii) an HSDir could
be responsible for an onion service simply by chance rather than on purpose,
resulting in a false positive, and (iii) our list of onion services is not exhaustive,
so we are bound to miss victims. Nevertheless our tool identified four onion ser-
vices (see Table 3) for which we have strong evidence that they were purposely
targeted. While HSDirs are frequently in the vicinity of an onion service’s de-
scriptor by accident, the probability of being in its vicinity for several days in a
row or cover both replicas by chance is negligible. Table 4 shows all partial col-
lisions in detail. Because none of these four services seem to have been intended
for private use, we are comfortable publishing them.
22u75kqyl666joi2.onion The service appears to be offline today, so we were
unable to see for ourselves what it hosted. According to cached index pages
we found online, the onion service used to host a technology-focused forum
in Chinese. A set of relays targeted the onion service on both August 14 and
15, 2015 by providing nine out of the total of twelve responsible HSDirs.
n3q7l52nfpm77vnf.onion As of February 2017, the service is still online, hosting
the “Marxists Internet Archive,” an online archive of literature.8 A set of
7 Both the tool and our list of onion services are available online at
https://nymity.ch/anomalous-tor-keys/.
8 The onion service seems to be identical to the website https://www.marxists.org
(visited on 2017-05-09).
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Table 3. The four onion services that were most likely targeted at some point. The
second column indicates if only one or both replicas were attacked while the third
column shows the duration of the attack.
Onion service Replicas Attack duration
22u75kqyl666joi2.onion 2 Two consecutive days
n3q7l52nfpm77vnf.onion 2 Six non-consecutive days
silkroadvb5piz3r.onion 1 Nine mostly consecutive days
thehub7gqe43miyc.onion 2 One day
relays targeted the onion service from November 27 to December 4, 2016.
The malicious HSDirs acted inconsistently, occasionally targeting only one
replica.
silkroadvb5piz3r.onion The onion service used to host the Silk Road market-
place, whose predominant use was a market for narcotics. The service was
targeted by a set of relays from May 21 to June 3, 2013. The HSDirs were
part of a measurement experiment that resulted in a blog post [26].
thehub7gqe43miyc.onion The onion service used to host a discussion forum, “The
Hub,” focused on darknet markets. A set of relays targeted both of The Hub’s
replicas from August 22, 2015.
Our data cannot provide insight into what the HSDirs did once they con-
trolled the replicas of the onion services they targeted. The HSDirs could have
counted the number of client requests, refused to serve the onion service’s de-
scriptor to take it offline, or correlate client requests with guard relay traffic in
order to deanonymize onion service visitors as it was done by the CMU/SEI
researchers in 2014 [8]. Since these attacks were short-lived we find it unlikely
that they were meant to take offline the respective onion services.
6 Discussion
We now turn to the technical and ethical implications of our research, propose
possible future work, and explain how the next generation of onion services will
thwart DHT manipulation attacks.
6.1 Implications of anomalous Tor keys
Implications for the network As touched on earlier in Section 2.2, the main use
of the identity key in Tor is to sign the relay’s descriptor, which includes various
information about the relay, e.g., its IP address and contact information. Relays
publish their public identity keys in their descriptor. The network consensus acts
as the public key infrastructure of Tor. Signed by the directory authorities whose
public keys are hard-coded in Tor’s source code, the network consensus points
to the descriptors of each Tor relay that is currently online. If an attacker were
to break the identity key of a relay (as we demonstrated), she could start signing
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descriptors in the relay’s name and publishing them. The adversary could publish
whatever information she wanted in the descriptor, e.g. her own IP address, keys,
etc., in order to fool Tor clients. In other words, weak keys allow adversaries to
obtain the affected relay’s reputation which matters because Tor clients make
routing decisions based on this reputation.
The Tor protocol’s use of forward secrecy mitigates the potential harm of
weak keys. Recall that a relay’s long-lived identity keys are only used to sign
data, so forward secrecy does not apply here. Onion keys, however, are used for
decryption and encryption and are rotated by default every 28 days [32, § 3.4.1].
An attacker who manages to compromise a weak onion key is still faced with
the underlying TLS layer, shown in Figure 1, which provides defense in depth.
The Tor specification requires the keys for the TLS layer to be rotated at least
once a day [9, § 1.1], making it difficult to get any use out of compromised onion
keys.
Implications for Tor users To understand how Tor users are affected by weak
keys we need to distinguish between targeting and hoovering adversaries.9 The
goal of targeting adversaries is to focus an attack on a small number of users
among the large set of all Tor users. Generally speaking, weak keys can be
problematic in a targeted setting if they allow an attacker to gain access to a
Tor relay she would otherwise be unable to control. This can be the case if the
attacker learned the targeted user’s guard relay, and the guard happens to have
weak keys. However, judging by our experimental results, the probability of an
attacker’s knowing a targeted user’s guard relay and said guard relay’s having
vulnerable keys is very low.
Hoovering adversaries are opportunistic by definition and seek to deanonymize
as many Tor users as possible. Recall that Tor clients use a long-lived guard re-
lay as their first hop and two randomly chosen relays for the next two hops.10
A single compromised relay is not necessarily harmful to users but weak keys
can be a problem if a user happens to have a guard relay with weak keys and
selects an exit relay that also has weak keys, allowing the hoovering adversary
to deanonymize the circuit. Again, considering the low prevalence of weak keys
and the ease with which The Tor Project could identify and block relays with
weak keys, hoovering adversaries pose no significant threat.
6.2 Preventing non-standard exponents
Recall that the Tor reference implementation hard-codes its public RSA expo-
nent to 65,537 [9, § 0.3]. The Tor Project could prevent non-standard exponents
by having the directory authorities reject relays whose descriptors have an RSA
9 We here use Jaggard and Syverson’s nomenclature of an adversary that either targets
specific Tor users (targeting) or hoovers up all available data to deanonymize as many
users as possible (hoovering) [17].
10 We refer to these relays as randomly chosen for simplicity, but the path selection
algorithm is more complicated.
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exponent other than 65,537, thus slowing down the search for fingerprint pre-
fixes. Adversaries would then have to iterate over the primes p or q instead of
the exponent, rendering the search computationally more expensive because of
the cost of primality tests. Given that we discovered only 122 unusual exponents
in over ten years of data, we believe that rejecting non-standard exponents is a
viable defense in depth.
6.3 Analyzing onion service public keys
Future work should shed light on the public keys of onion services. Onion services
have an incentive to modify their fingerprints to make them both recognizable
and easier to remember. Facebook, for example, was lucky to obtain the easy-to-
remember onion domain facebookcorewwwi.onion [24]. The tool Scallion assists
onion service operators in creating such vanity domains [29]. The implications of
vanity domains on usability and security are still poorly understood [37]. Unlike
the public keys of relays, onion service keys are not archived, so a study would
have to begin with actively fetching onion service keys.
6.4 Investigating the vulnerability of Tor relays to attacks on
Diffie-Hellman
Recent work has demonstrated how Diffie-Hellman key exchange is vulnerable
to attack [1,35,10]. Because Tor uses Diffie-Hellman, we decided to investigate
how it might be affected by those findings. The Tor specification states that
the implementation uses the Second Oakley Group for Diffie-Hellman, where
the prime number is 1024 bits long [9, § 0.3]. To gather evidence of this usage,
we performed an nmap scan on Tor relays using the ssl-dh-params script [12],
which confirmed the Tor specification. The use of a 1024-bit prime is concerning
because Adrian et al. [1] stated that “1024-bit discrete log may be within reach
for state-level actors,” and thus, they suggest a move to 2048 bits. The authors
also mention that developers should move away from using 1024-bit RSA, as
well, which Tor uses.
6.5 In vivo Tor research
Caution must be taken when conducting research using the live Tor network.
Section 5.1 showed how a small mistake in key generation led to many vulnerable
Tor relays. To keep its users safe, The Tor Project has recently launched a
research safety board whose aim is to assist researchers in safely conducting Tor
measurement studies [33]. This may entail running experiments in private Tor
networks that are controlled by the researchers or using network simulators such
as Shadow [18].
As for our own work, we were in close contact with Tor developers throughout
our research effort and shared preliminary results as we progressed. Once we
wrote up our findings in a technical report, we brought it to the broader Tor
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community’s attention by sending an email to the tor-dev mailing list [28]. On
top of that, we adopted open science practices and wrote both our code and
paper in the open, allowing interested parties to follow our progress easily.
6.6 The effect of next-generation onion services
As of December 2017, The Tor Project is testing the implementation of next-
generation onion services [22]. In addition to stronger cryptographic primitives,
the design fixes the issue of predicting an onion service’s location in the hash
ring by incorporating a random element. This element is produced by having the
directory authorities agree on a random number once a day [34]. The random
number is embedded in the consensus document and used by clients to fetch
an onion service’s descriptor. Attackers will no longer be able to attack onion
services by positioning HSDirs in the hash ring; while they have several hours
to compute a key pair that positions their HSDirs next to the onion service’s
descriptor (which is entirely feasible), it takes at least 96 hours to get the HSDir
flag from the directory authorities [32, § 3.4.2], so attackers cannot get the flag in
time. We expect this design change to disincentivize attackers from manipulating
their keys to attack onion services.
7 Conclusion
Inspired by recent research that studied weak keys in deployed systems, we set
out to investigate if the Tor network suffers from similar issues. To that end, we
drew on a public archive containing cryptographic keys of Tor relays dating back
to 2005, which we subsequently analyzed for weak RSA keys. We discovered that
(i) ten relays shared an RSA modulus, (ii) 3,557 relays shared prime factors,
and (iii) 122 relays used non-standard RSA exponents.
Having uncovered these anomalies, we then proceeded to characterize the
affected relays, tracing back the issues to mostly harmless experiments run by
academic researchers and hobbyists, but also to attackers that targeted Tor’s
distributed hash table which powers onion services. To learn more, we imple-
mented a tool that can determine what onion services were attacked by a given
set of malicious Tor relays, revealing four onion services that fell prey to these
attacks.
The practical value of our work is twofold. First, our uncovering and char-
acterizing of Tor relays with anomalous keys provides an anatomy of real-world
attacks that The Tor Project can draw upon to improve its monitoring infras-
tructure for malicious Tor relays. Second, our work provides The Tor Project
with tools to verify the RSA keys of freshly set up relays, making the network
safer for its users. In addition, onion service operators can use our code to mon-
itor their services and get notified if Tor relays make an effort to deanonymize
their onion service. We believe that this is particularly useful for sensitive de-
ployments such as SecureDrop instances.
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A Potentially targeted onion services
Table 4. The details of the attacks on four onion services. The second column shows
the fingerprints of the HSDirs that were participating in the attack. The third column
shows the affected onion service descriptors, followed by the date of the attack in the
last column.
Onion service Truncated HSDir fingerprint Truncated onion service descriptor Date
22u75kqyl666joi2 325CAC0B7FA8CD77E39D 325CAC08B0A3180B590E 2015-08-14
325CAC0AB1AAD27493B9 325CAC08B0A3180B590E 2015-08-14
325CAC0A43B2121B81CD 325CAC08B0A3180B590E 2015-08-14
FA256741ED22FD96AF5A FA256740740356704AB8 2015-08-14
FA256743ACFCA9B7C85D FA256740740356704AB8 2015-08-14
E5E778326AF0FF0A634A E5E7783245096FB554A1 2015-08-15
A5C59B3D0FFBDE88405E A5C59B3CD34802FC4AC3 2015-08-15
A5C59B3FCCD2FA8FAD42 A5C59B3CD34802FC4AC3 2015-08-15
A5C59B3FD5625A0D85D1 A5C59B3CD34802FC4AC3 2015-08-15
n3q7l52nfpm77vnf A0E83AA191220B240EC0 A0E83AA115098CA7FE9B 2016-11-27
A0E83AA28382135DC839 A0E83AA115098CA7FE9B 2016-11-27
EBF154DA21B49101ED5B EBF154D809425D3E923E 2016-11-28
EBF154D8BB6EECCC2921 EBF154D809425D3E923E 2016-11-28
EBF154D9E2B10A2420E0 EBF154D809425D3E923E 2016-11-28
6761D2BE758FA0D76822 6761D2BCF40FF34274F3 2016-11-29
59E415D78921BFF88168 59E415D5075157CAADB7 2016-11-29
26597E62875C498AC139 26597E6048BF7CC9D593 2016-11-30
26597E61DDFEE78F336D 26597E6048BF7CC9D593 2016-11-30
7CDB224FE64F2A50CC50 7CDB224DC51432C037C5 2016-11-30
2D148D3EBF9D2B9D8CCB 2D148D3CB6C5FC4DCA14 2016-12-01
2E25D8469331FEAE933D 2E25D842BF5DDA936BA2 2016-12-05
2E25D847E579AED1B0EC 2E25D842BF5DDA936BA2 2016-12-05
2E25D8454C96E20CF153 2E25D842BF5DDA936BA2 2016-12-05
2E25D846564DCBE43CD2 2E25D842BF5DDA936BA2 2016-12-05
2E25D8447518DA93B4FF 2E25D842BF5DDA936BA2 2016-12-05
264EA12B47CBCC8043C5 264EA12410F7D9CD6E54 2016-12-05
264EA1284855A596D5D6 264EA12410F7D9CD6E54 2016-12-05
264EA12B4C46672E002C 264EA12410F7D9CD6E54 2016-12-05
silkroadvb5piz3r BC89A92F53581C4F6169 BC89A889D3DF7F0027A5 2013-05-21
712CA45AF4055E7AC69A 712CA3DEF4EB21C76A95 2013-05-22
DE15299D7EE5882F0BEF DE1529316F5172B35B8E 2013-05-23
FF0BF54FBEEE7A003CE6 FF0BF49076AA63C97FA2 2013-05-24
E9F25C4899F9DC81E48E E9F25BBA0D4501FAE18B 2013-05-28
B81B43C015DE42D05208 B81B43637F22592ECC80 2013-05-29
59529817C6E797D78311 5952979BD9FEECE847E7 2013-05-31
BCB332864640653892D4 BCB33236E0AD461DF585 2013-06-02
51FC178DFF3D0B869760 51FC172F0062B623A39D 2013-06-03
thehub7gqe43miyc F6961286D361F825A9AD F6961286C2FEEA8DEDEB 2015-08-22
F6961286C453F6A6381D F6961286C2FEEA8DEDEB 2015-08-22
F6961286D826D7D1C0F9 F6961286C2FEEA8DEDEB 2015-08-22
816FEE16200BE1719D00 816FEE15D26F41A72039 2015-08-22
